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The Science, Fiction, and Science Fiction of Unsex Mothering 
 
I. Glenn Cohen[1] 
 
Harvard Journal of Law and Gender Symposium on Darren Rosenblum’s Unsex 
Mothering: Toward a Culture of New Parenting 
 
 
In her novel Woman on the Edge of Time, the Canadian Feminist writer Marge Piercy’s 
protagonist, Connie Ramos, incarcerated in a mental institution, time travels to a set of 
possible futures that reflect utopian and dystopian visions of social make-up.[2]  Among 
other things, the more utopian possible future world has embraced many of the ideas 
explored by Darren Rosenblum’s Unsex Mothering: sex roles, gender hierarchy, and 
motherhood as we know it have been eliminated; children are no longer born by women, 
but instead incubated in a “brooder” and raised by three genetically unrelated “co-
mothers,” at least two of whom, regardless of their sex, take hormones allowing them to 
nurse such that even men breast feed.[3]  Ethnic and cultural heritage too has been 
reconfigured and distributed geographically, such that all citizens of a particular city 
regardless of their ethnic backgrounds follow the Native American ways, while another 
city might follow the ways of a different cultural or ethnic background.[4] 
 
I think of Rosenblum’s fascinating paper as beginning the legal scholarship twin project 
to Piercy’s novel.  In this short response, I want to examine a set of possible future 
worlds with various kinds of unsexed motherhood and press Rosenblum on the normative 
criteria by which one might choose between them, something his Article does not focus 
on. 
 
I. A MULTIVERSE OF UNSEXED MOTHERING 
 
While Piercy’s protagonist travels to several possible futures, for our purposes a more 
useful thought experiment is of someone traveling to other possible parallel universes.  
This is a frequent trope of science fiction, where in these parallel universes many things 
are just like our own but some things are radically different.[5] 
 
Imagine our protagonist has the ability to control his or her travel across parallel 
universes in the multiverse.[6]  We could imagine a series of possible versions of our 
lives with different kinds of unsexed motherhood.  Rosenblum mentions or at least 
gestures at some of these, but let me be more explicit and taxonomical about it by 
describing the way in which possible universes can differ in regard to his project: 
 
First, we have differences between possible worlds pertaining to sex and its fixedness. 
 
Name    Description 
   
 
Androgynia: There is but one biological sex.[7] Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2087603
 
Transgenderia Pregnantia: There are two biological sexes but one can shift 
one’s biological sex to the other (but only once), and yet when the shifting is 
complete a male who becomes a female can get pregnant and a female who shifts 
to becoming a male cannot. 
 
Transgenderia Socia: There are two biological sexes but one can shift one’s 
biological sex to the other (but only once), and the shifting does not affect the 
internal reproductive organs such that only those born biological women can 
reproduce. 
 
Then we have differences based on the way reproduction takes place. 
 
Artificia Mandatoria: For reasons of biology or law, a child can only be 
produced by artificial means requiring no genetic or gestational contribution by 
any parent. 
 
Artificia Optionalia: Parents may opt for but are not required to produce a child 
by artificial means that require no genetic or gestational contribution by any 
parent.  Those doing it the “old-fashioned” way use coital reproduction between 
members of opposite sexes. 
 
Then we can specify differences as to requirements for parenting, biological and social: 
 
Dyadica Biologica: Two parents are required for reproduction, whatever their 
sex. 
 
Dyadica Socia: Two parents are required for rearing of the child even if not for 
its biological production.[8] 
 
Then we can specify differences as to how rearing duties are divided:   
 
Equalia: All rearing duties and benefits of parenting are performed/enjoyed 
identically by all parents of a child. 
 
Equitia: All rearing duties and benefits of parenting are split equitably between 
the parents, but they do not do it identically. 
 
Ouvertia: Parenting roles like “mother” and “father” are fixed but can be 
occupied by members of either biological sex. 
 
Fixtia: Parenting roles like “mother” and “father” are fixed to biological sex, with 
women as mothers and men as fathers. 
 Contractia: Parenting roles are set at a default by sex as in our world but they can 
be readjusted by the agreement of both parents to whatever components or 
division is desired. 
 
 
This is merely a preliminary and certainly non-exhaustive suggestion in terms of the list 
of variables.  We then have a large number of combinatorial possibilities producing quite 
different possible visions of unsexed motherhood that our hypothetical multiverse jumper 
could choose from. 
 
Would he or she prefer to travel to the universe “androgynia artificia optionalia dyadica 
socialia”—where everyone is of the same sex and reproduction can occur either through 
same-sex sexual contact or artificial reproduction, but it requires two parents to raise each 
child, or “transgenderia socia dyadica biologica”—where individuals begin with a 
biological sex, which they can change other than for pregnancy related purposes, and 
require someone born of the opposite sex to reproduce, but can rear children alone?  Even 
the less outlandish possibilities present some interesting hard choices.  Is Rosenblum’s 
vision of unsexed motherhood better captured by the “dyadica biologica ouvertia” 
universe—where both sexes are needed to reproduce and there are distinct “mother” and 
“father” roles but either gender can play them, “dyadica biologica contractia”—where the 
default mother and father roles can be adjusted based on preference, or “dyadica 
biologica equalia”—where each person in the parenting dyad occupies the role of mother 
and father all the time? 
 
II. A NORMATIVE GUIDE FOR UNSEXED MOTHERING 
 
Now that we can see the multiverse of unsexed mothering possibilities, we can ask: how 
are we to choose between them?  Rosenblum in this work (though this is perhaps only a 
small part of a bigger project) does not really try to suggest normative criteria for 
deciding which of the possible universes to favor, or (more down to earth) what the law 
should aim at here.  In the small space that remains, let me suggest a few ways he could 
go about doing that, but the list is far from exhaustive: 
 
(1) Administrability. If we drop our science fiction fig leaf and instead, perhaps more 
like Piercy’s protagonists, imagine these as possible futures that the law (among other 
institutions) could push society toward, some of the possible futures seem more within 
our grasp than others.  One way for Rosenblum to choose would be to favor the social 
arrangement that (1) maximally queers motherhood and (2) is actually feasible.  This 
approach would still require both a conception of which universe maximally queers 
motherhood and a normative argument for why that should be our goal.  Therefore, this 
approach may in turn depend on some of the other approaches I list. 
 
(2) Distribution and the Interests of Status Quo Holders. If we again imagine this as a 
choice between possible futures, but near futures, perhaps one way to think about this 
would be what would be better for people who currently exist, and may win or lose from 
the move to one of these new unsexed models.  Of course, how to factor in those prior holdings is complex.  One possibility would be to see if the change is Kaldor-Hicks 
efficient—do the winners make enough that they could compensate the losers?  Another 
approach (that would probably freeze any change) would be to ask whether the change is 
Pareto Superior—is at least one person made better off and no one made worse off?  In 
between there are many other possibilities, including asking whether the change would 
maximally benefit the worst off.[9] 
 
(3) Better for the Children. One approach would be to give the children’s interests a 
veto or at least a very large say in which of these schemes we move to.  This would raise 
the empirical question: what is best for children?  One problem with this approach that 
I’ve written about elsewhere is that when legal or even social rules are altered to protect 
the children, but they alter whether or not particular children come into existence, they 
cannot be defended on Best Interests of the Children rationale.[10] 
 
(4) Blank Slate: All Things Considered Better. A different possible normative criterion 
is to imagine we were operating on a blank slate.  Perhaps we can change the rules only 
prospectively or phase them in such a way that there is no one who is hurt with a claim of 
entitlement under the old system.  Another way to get at this would be to imagine one 
really were jumping between universes and choosing which of them to live in.  Figuring 
out which of these possible worlds is better, all things considered, would be a challenging 
and exciting project.  It is not one that Rosenblum particularly develops here, but it is one 
I very much hope he undertakes in expanding this paper into a larger project. 
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